Details of Singapores immigration policy and its developed status?

1 ANSWERS

1. Guest1941
   

   From 1971 to 1984, the Singapore economy grew steadily. The ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) regime began to set long-term targets for Singapore to become a developed nation. In 1984, first Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong set the target for Singapore to attain the 1984 Swiss Per Capita GNP by 1999. In 1991, a Strategic Economic Plan (SEP) was announced.
   In October 1997, the Centre for Advanced Studies in the National University of Singapore organized a “Singapore towards a developed status” conference. One of the presenters, chief statistician Dr Paul Cheung stated growth rates of total population had been consistently higher than the resident population of citizens and permanent residents since 1990, reflecting the large inflows of foreigners. Annual permanent residencies granted rose from 9,000 in 1988 to 25,000 in the 1992-1996 period.
   In the immediate period before and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997, PAP politicians were openly talking about significantly increasing the population size. In April 1997 Deputy Prime Minister Dr Tony Tan said Singapore would face a shortage of 7,000 undergraduates in 2000. On Aug 1997 Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong called for proactive effort to attract what he termed as foreign talents.
   An important decision was to increase the population to the 4 million mark by 2002. This was 30 years earlier than anticipated by the SEP.  In Sep 1997 Home Affairs Minister Mr Wong Kan Seng announced he was planning for 35,000 to 40,000 PRs each year. Another academic presenter, Dr Tan Khee Giap of the Nanyang Business School predicted an annual inflow of 35,000 or more immigrants which were said to be skilled and talented.
   Dr Tan presented arguments in favour of a massive population increase. Firstly, the supposed tight labour market could be eased. Singapore could look beyond greater flexibility from its existing labour force pool. Secondly the presumed labour shortage could be sensitively managed to ensure productivity and moderate competitive wage growth. Thirdly, he hoped “an oasis of talent with global links” would probably be the strongest basis for achieving the long-term sustainable growth path.
   The vision for a bigger population occurred when the resident total fertility rate (TFR) dropped from 2.1 in 1975 to 1.4 in 1986.  After the PAP regime officially started a pro-natalist policy in 1987, the TFR rose slightly to 1.75 in 1996 but consistently below the 2.1 replacement level. Dr Cheung attributed the falling TFR largely due to education and career advancements of women.
   Immigration was also to counter population ageing. From 1997 to 2009, the resident population increased by 19.5% from 3.12 million to 3.73 million. Within the same period, TFR decreased from 1.61 to 1.22 and resident median age increased by 4.3 years from 32.6 years to 36.9 years. In an earlier similar period from 1985 to 1997, resident median age increased by 5.4 years from 27.2 years in 1985 to 32.6 years in 1997. More residents meant less resident babies.
   Dr Cheung did not mention how employment pressures and rising costs on both males and females would bring down TFR. The PAP regime’s main focus was on rising female expectations. This could be seen through a brief browsing of women’s lifestyle magazines (Her World, Go, Female) published by the mainstream media from 1994 to 1996.  The main topic revolved around changing social values and career advancement for young adult women. The future costs of raising children were not important.
   The tight labour market mentioned by Dr Tan was indeed eased. Together with one economic downturn after another from 1997 to 2010, hiring and promoting became very flexible. According to the mainstream media, a population segment with the socially acceptable term “jobseekers in between jobs” took shape. This was a collection of long-term structurally unemployed and underemployed persons. Some were forced to become self-employed because they had difficulty seeking regular employment.
   With more young people between the ages of 13 and 30 were brought in. National Service (NS) responsibilities became an issue. This liability was based on existing 16.5 year old male PRs and Citizens. The proactive immigration policy meant more foreign males between 21 and 35 years old were able to obtain Permanent Residencies and Citizenships without having to serve any NS.
   Technological and tactical changes had reduced existing NS manpower needs. The PAP regime was mainly concerned about long term needs. Therefore it did not see the existing inequality as a problem. It hoped these 1st generation NS-exempted PRs would have NS-serving sons. When it was highlighted some NS-exempted PRs were planning how to enable their male children to continue residing in Singapore while legally evading NS, the PAP regime had no answer.
   Dr Tan had emphasized the importance of being able to attract a substantial core group of foreign talent with high-technology skills and professionals with international exposure to Singapore. The influx of NS-exempted young foreign males in the information technology, financial and engineering sectors at various workplace levels became one of the bitter complaints against the immigration policy.
   Dr Tan highlighted the challenges of a bigger population in land use and population density. He held that these could be overcome with good planning, the willingness of people to accept a living space per head and disseminated of information emphasizing the expected contribution of supposedly foreign talents. In later years, packed subway trains became a symbol of increasing public anxiety on whether Singapore had become overcrowded
   The crowding issue occurred with more PRs. They rose from 112,100 in 1990 to 287,500 in 2000 and to 533,200 in 2009. This meant an approximate doubling per decade. The anxious public argued various pressures in Singapore meant more foreigners were mainly interested in making money in Singapore before relocating. The anxious public doubted more foreigners meant more beneficial long-term social effects.
   Dr Tan did not support a “Singaporean will always come first” policy. The immigrant influx eventually created a debate over the Singaporean identity. The immediate topic was Citizens versus PRs. Other variations of the debate also emerged. These included but not restricted to Home-grown Citizens versus Newly Naturalized Citizens and NS-serving PRs versus their counterparts who did not serve.
   Some people began to wonder whether the Swiss target meant anything in a period of continuous living costs increases.  There was another lesser-known Swiss standard. Dr Cheung noted as of 1990, Switzerland had a 17% foreign population. It was engaged in a greater range of economic sectors compared to foreigners in Singapore. This situation might have influenced the PAP regime’s immigration policy planning.
   Dr Tan suggested that acceptance of more immigrants could be cultivated by integrating the younger population of the notion, experience and challenges of a cosmopolitan society. PAP politicians later acknowledged the younger home-grown population had become more critical of the PAP, especially its immigration policy.  In 2009, the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports announced the formation of a $10 million integration fund with the hope of easing social tensions.
   Dr Cheung assumed that with the existing rate of economic expansion, there would be a clear shortage of potential job entrants. On a macro level, an increase in younger foreigners in the workforce was supposed to support the local elderly. However, after 1997, the mainstream media had continuously highlighted more locals in various sectors above the age of 35 were simply pushed out of the workforce in order to make way for these foreigners.
   Government and related organizations were not necessarily friendlier to the re-employment retention of older employees. One measurement used by Dr Cheung was the ratio of 20-39 year olds to 40-59 year olds within the population. He described the 40-59 year olds as retirees and older workers due for retirement. If this was the prevailing social attitude, it was certainly not good for extending the employment of older persons.
   Total population increased by from 3 million in 1990 to 4 million in 2000 and to 5 million in 2009. This was a 1 million net addition per decade, 100,000 annually or a cumulative 67%. Critics disagreed on when the immigration policy became a problem due to the varying impact of a marginal population increase. Meanwhile, they agreed foreign talent was too broad. It seemed to include anyone who was above the status of low-end construction workers or equivalent.
   The immigration policy supporters did not differentiate between various foreigner categories. For example, when critics were unhappy with more foreign engineers, these supporters told these critics to take over the jobs of foreign construction workers. Alternatively, they countered the critics’ immigrant ancestry meant no right of opposition. A closer understanding of history showed the PAP regime’s existing immigration policy had little to do with the labourers of a century ago.
   Some supporters continued to insist the foreign influx was only restricted to a small group of sector positions despite obvious evidence to the contrary. One example was the formation of Contact Singapore in 2008 by the Economic Development Board and the Ministry of Manpower. It has the stated aim of attracting what it claimed to be global talent to be work, invest and live in Singapore. The relevant industries had a wide range from aerospace to the public sector with conventional executive and managerial positions.
   The big immigration increase was the strategic objective of the PAP regime. From 1990 to 2009, the population had largely grew at 3% annually while the resident component growing at about 2%. Since 1990, the resident population had generally been growing between 1-2% annually. It consistently rejected any attempts to slow the immigration flow after economic problems emerged since 1997.
   The immigration policy became a repeated General Election topic. The PAP remained confident as it won 75.3% valid votes in 2001 and 66.6% in 2006.  It thought socio-economic integration between immigrants and existing locals would occur quickly and generate more value. It felt this supposed integration would turn Singapore into a developed global hub.  It was not worried about crowding out effects.

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